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COMMENT
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: PRODUCERS
OF SEINFELD OVERCOME PUBLISHER'S
FAIR USE DEFENSE USING THE SHOW'S
STRONGEST WEAPON-NOTHING: CASTLE
ROCK ENTERTAINMENT, INC. V. CAROL
PUBLISHING GROUP, INC.
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."' In line with these goals,
the Copyright Act of 19762 grants copyright owners many
exclusive rights, including the right to reproduce work, the right
to prepare derivative works, and the right to distribute copies of
the work.3 Unauthorized copying by another may constitute
1 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. The underlying policy is that potential progress
will be maximized if individuals are given sufficient incentive to make their work
accessible to the public. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 209 (1954)). The protection
individuals receive is limited to allow, and even encourage, the public to make
further use of individuals' contributions. Thus, financial benefit to the creator is
incidental rather than central to the doctrine. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (discussing the balance between the economic
incentive to the author and the need to promote availability of copyrighted materials
to the public). Copyright limitations are necessary to further public interest but
should not be so burdensome that they deprive authors of a fair share of the revenue
generated by their works. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 229 (1990) (quoting
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 87th CONG., 1st SESS., 6
(Comm. Print 1961)). Although protection is for a limited time, nothing prevents the
author from hoarding his rights during that time. See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228-29.
The Supreme Court has held that a copyright holder can arbitrarily refuse to license
a work. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
2 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (1976).
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). Section 106 provides in part:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following.
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infringement upon the rights of a valid copyright owner.4 This is
not the case if the copied material is an idea 5 or fact 6 rather than
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending; ....
Id. § 106.
A derivative work is defined as one:
based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, ficitionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship,
is a "derivative work."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
4 See Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
52 (1998); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). A
plaintiffmust show both ownership of a valid copyright and unauthorized copying by
the defendant. See Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1992)
(citing Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1992)); Folio Impressions, Inc. v.
Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1991); Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313,
1320 (2d Cir. 1989)). The two issues to be proven by the plaintiff for a prima facie
case of copyright infringement are actual copying and improper or unlawful
appropriation. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 361.
5 "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Copyright law does not protect ideas,
although the way they are expressed may be protected. See Craft v. Kobler, 667 F.
Supp. 120, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Direct quotation or copying of a copyrighted work is
infringement unless justification is shown. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. Protected writing is
also infringed by close paraphrase. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90,
97 (2d Cir. 1987). The difference between idea and expression is not always easy to
determine. See Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.
1976). Copyright does not protect thematic concepts or scenes that necessarily follow
from common plot situations. See id. These are often referred to as "scenes a faire."
Id. For example, an author's story about a quarrel between a Jewish and an Irish
father whose children's marriage leads to their reconciliation, was not infringed
upon by a film with a common storyline. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
6 Facts cannot be copyrighted, but compilations of facts are within the subject
matter of copyright. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 344-45. There is a
prerequisite of originality for copyright protection. See id. To qualify as "original" a
work must be independently created by an author and must show a minimal degree
of creativity. See id. Facts, in and of themselves, do not satisfy constitutionally
mandated originality requirement of copyright. See id. at 346-48. Facts do not owe
their origin to an author. See id. Factual compilations, on the other hand, may be
found to have a minimal degree of originality and will then qualify for copyright
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an expression, or if the copied material falls within the realm of a
fair use,7 such as: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research.
protection. See id. at 348. If so, the protection will only extend to original elements of
the work. See id. For example, an original manner in which facts are expressed or an
original format in which facts are arranged will be protected. See id. at 348-49. The
underlying facts, however, may be freely exploited. See id, see also National
Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that
although a broadcast is copyrightable, the actual event, such as a basketball game,
is not, because broadcasts have an author unlike the underlying events which do
not).
Note that there are cases in which the informational value of the facts presented
cannot be separated from the expression itself. If the public interest in
disseminating such facts is great, a court will probably hold that an appropriation of
the facts by one other than the copyright holder is fair use. See Monster
Communications v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(explaining that the protection afforded to film footage of Muhammed Ali and George
Foreman training for a fight in Zaire must be balanced with the public's need for
having competing biographers tell the fighters' stories). For a case in which the type
of informational content weighed heavily against the copyright holder, see Time Inc.
v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where defendant's
unauthorized usage of the Zapruder film of the Kennedy assassination was found to
be fair use, largely due to public interest. See Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d
1067 (2d Cir. 1992) (determining that ego fixations cannot be copyrighted, because
they are a factual discovery rather than a philosophical creation); see also New Era
Publications Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990) (dealing with
publication of L. Ron Hubbard's writing on The Church of Scientology).
7 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985)
(explaining that copyright owner's rights exclude facts and ideas, and fair use). Note
that another possible defense to copyright infringement is that the use of the copied
material was de miniris. If this defense is applicable it should be made prior to a
fair use defense. If the court finds that the copying was de minimis, no cause of
action will lie for copyright infringement and there will be no need to reach the issue
of fair use. See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 1998)
(affirming district court's holding that defendant's use of plaintiff's photographs was
de minimis, but stating it was error to resolve a fair use claim without first
determining whether the infringement was de minimis); Ringgold v. Black
Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that fair use
analysis need not be reached when use of copied material is insubstantial); 4
MELVILLE B. NIMIER & DAVID NIMIER, NIMMEB ON COPYRIGHT §13.03[F] [5] at 13-
145 to -147 (1999) (describing de minimis standard as below the quantitative
threshold of substantial similarity).
Unauthorized but fair uses of copyrighted material do not constitute copyright
infringement. See Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 549. The fair use doctrine
has developed side by side with copyright protection in order to ensure that the goal
of progress, as articulated by the Constitution, is achieved. See Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994). The doctrine of fair use creates a
privilege for one other than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material
in a reasonable manner absent consent. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966) (quoting BALL, COPYRIGHT AND
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The preceding list of possible fair uses8 is neither exhaustive
nor dispositive. 9 Congress has stated that the following factors
should be considered when making a fair use determination: the
purpose and character of the use, whether it is of a commercial
nature or for non-profit educational purposes, the nature of the
copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and the
effect upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted
work.10 This fact sensitive1' multifactor 12 analysis is not to be
LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). Fair use balances the exclusive rights of a
copyright holder with the public's interest in access to valuable information. See
Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977).
In Wainwright, the court held that defendants' publishing of abstracts of plaintiffs
financial research reports was not a fair use. See id. at 96. The defendants argued
that not only was their use fair but that the publication of abstracts deserved First
Amendment protection. See id. at 95. The court rejected the First Amendment
argument, acknowledging that conflicts between the First Amendment and
copyright laws have been resolved in favor of fair use. See id. (citing Walt Disney
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 115 (N.D.Cal. 1972), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 581 F.2d 751); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415,
422 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)). Thus, fair use may overcome a First Amendment challenge.
It seems that fair use should be viewed as a limitation on the otherwise broad
scope of protection afforded by copyright law, rather than a narrow exception. In
essence, fair use is a mitigating doctrine which allows courts to avoid a "rigid
application" of the copyright statute in instances where such an application would
inhibit the very goals the statute was intended to promote. See Iowa State Univ.
Research Found., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980).
8 Fair use was judge-made doctrine until the passage of the Copyright Act of
1976 in which Justice Story's view is recognizable. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576
(citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111
(1990)). In Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901), a
seminal opinion in copyright law, Judge Story noted that what constitutes copyright
infringement is sometimes clear but can be very subtle and evanescent. In analyzing
a copied work Judge Story suggested a multifactor analysis of the nature, extent and
value of materials used, the objects of the work and the accessibility to the
information used. See id. Judge Story then suggested an approach to determining
whether use of copyrighted material was permissible in some circumstances. See
infra note 45.
9 See Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 561. The examples listed appear in
the § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976 and they give an idea of uses that will be
considered fair. See id. Courts analyze what may or may not constitute "fair use" by
weighing each of the factors listed in § 107 however, these factors are not the only
ones taken into account. See Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 736 (2d
Cir. 1991) (favoring the defendant because the use made of the copyrighted material
fell within § 107).
10 The fair use defense was recognized in the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 107
of the Copyright Act provides:
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simplified with bright-line rules13 that elevate one factor above
the other.14 Recently, however, in Castle Rock Entertainment,
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work... for purposes such as criticism,
comment.... scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the
above factors.
17 U.S.C. §107 (1994).
Congress intended § 107 to restate preexisting judicial doctrine rather than
change it in any way. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473,
at 62 (1975). There are courts that have referred to § 107 as a "codification" of the
fair use doctrine. Yet, § 107 "is not a typical statutory provision" drafted by
Congress, but a restatement of the common law. See William F. Patry & Shira
Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued. Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 674 (1993).
The flexibility of the fair use doctrine allows courts to implement the diverse and
sometimes conflicting goals of copyright law, which include providing creators with
economic incentives and maximizing public access to their work. See Feist
Publications, 499 U.S. at 349-50 (stating that the primary objective of § 107 is to
promote progress rather than award authors). The four factors of § 107 are
interdependent and must be given equal weight. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
11 "Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact." See Harper & Row, Publishers,
471 U.S. at 560. If there are no genuine issues of fact, or if, even after resolving all
the issues in favor of the opposing party, a court believes that a reasonable trier of
fact could only reach one conclusion, then the court may decide if the use in issue
qualifies as fair use of the copyrighted material as a matter of law. See Diamond v.
Am-Law Publ'g Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1984). The fact that a fair use
question requires case-by-case examination of specific facts does not mean that in
each fair use case there are factual issues to be tried. See Wright, 953 F.2d at 735.
12 Fair use is considered in its totality, thus the moving party does not have to
prevail on every factor. See Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 847 F. Supp. 142, 146. (N.D.
Cal. 1994); Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 560.
13 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (warning that there are no "bright-line rules"
for the fair use doctrine and that any analysis should be made on a case-by-case
basis) (citations omitted); Patry & Permutter, supra note 10, at 672 (1993)
(remarking that "Itihe plain words of section 107 rule out application of brightline
tests"). Fair use is not a mechanical application. See Association of Am. Med.
Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1991).
14 Instead, courts are required to use inductive reasoning in making their
decisions. When engaging in inductive reasoning one seeks support for a conclusion
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Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc.,15 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals engaged in such a conclusory analysis 16 when it placed
excessive emphasis on the first factor 17 of the fair use test, under
§ 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.18 The court held that The
Seinfeld Aptitude Test ("The SAT"), a trivia book about events
and characters depicted on the television program Seinfeld,
unlawfully copied from Seinfeld and that its copying did not
constitute fair use and was thus actionable infringement.' 9
In Castle Rock Entertainment, defendants, Beth B. Golub
("Golub"), The SAT's author, and Carol Publishing Group, Inc.
("Carol Publishing"), its publisher, appealed from the judgment
of the district court granting the plaintiff, Castle Rock
Entertainment ("Castle Rock"), the producer and copyright owner
of each Seinfeld episode, summary judgment on a copyright
infringement claim.20 Seinfeld was a sitcom that revolved around
the daily annoyances in the lives of four single adult friends
through methods such as analogy or cause and effect. One must make a logical leap
between the premises and the conclusion. In deductive reasoning, the premises
directly ensure the conclusions. The deductive process may be viewed as more
simplistic.
15 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
16 Once the court found The SAT non-transformative, it gave little weight to the
other statutory factors. See Castle Rock Entertainment, 150 F.3d at 142-43.
17 See id. More specifically, the court placed emphasis on what it found to be the
non-transformative value of The SAT, as will be explained further throughout this
Comment.
18 See supra note 10 (quoting language of Copyright Act of 1976).
19 See Castle Rock Entertainment, 150 F.3d at 146. The court concluded "that
the copyright law's objective 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts'
would be undermined by permitting The SAT"s copying of Seinfeld." Id.
20 See id. at 135. The district court, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), granted
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. In addition, the court denied defendants'
cross-motion for summary judgment, awarded plaintiff $403,000 for defendants'
copyright infringement, and permanently enjoined defendants from publishing The
SAT. See id. Castle Rock had originally filed an "action alleging federal copyright
and trademark infringement and state law unfair competition." Id. at 136. Both
parties moved for summary judgment on both claims. See id. The district court
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff on the copyright claim, held that
defendants had violated plaintiffs copyrights in Seinfeld, and held that the copying
did not constitute fair use. See id. The district court did not grant summary
judgment to either party on the unfair competition claim. See id. at 137. The parties
stipulated to damages and attorney's fees on the copyright infringement claim and to
dismissal without prejudice of all remaining claims. See id. Carol Publishing's cross-
claims against Golub were dismissed with prejudice. See generally Castle Rock
Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997),
affd, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
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living in Manhattan.21 The SAT was a book written by Golub
based on the notes she took while watching episodes as they
aired on television and while reviewing them on videotape.22 The
book included 643 trivia questions drawn from the 84 out of 86
episodes that had been aired as of the time the book was
published.2 These included 211 multiple choice questions, 93
matching questions and a remainder of short-answer questions.24
Every answer in the book was taken from an episode of the show,
though the incorrect answer choices to the multiple-choice
questions were created by Golub.25 Actual dialogue from the
program was quoted in 41 of the book's questions.26 The parties
estimated that 3.6 percent (defendants' calculation) to 5.6
percent (plaintiffs calculation) of the show's dialogue was
included in the book.2 7  The SATs publication did not
immediately provoke a challenge and was even welcomed by
NBC, the network broadcasting Seinfeld.28 There was no
21 See Castle Rock Entertainment, 150 F.3d at 135. The characters are, of course,
Jerry Seinfeld, George Costanza, Elaine Benes and Cosmo Kramer. (What about
Newman? The author wonders).
2 See id. at 136.
23 See id. at 135-36.
24 See id. at 135. The questions were divided into the following five levels in
increasing order of difficulty: " Wuss Questions' ", " 'This, That, and the Other
Questions,' " " Tough Monkey Questions,' " " 'Atomic Wedgie Questions,' " and"
'Master of Your Domain Questions.' " See id. The following are sample questions:
1. To impress a woman, George passes himself off as
a) a gynecologist
b) a geologist
c) a marine biologist
d) a meteorologist.
11. What candy does Kramer snack on while observing a surgical
procedure from an operating room balcony?
12. Who said, "I don't go for those nonrefundable deals... I can't commit
to a woman.. rm not going to commit to an airline"?
a) Jerry
b) George
c) Kramer
Id. (omissions in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting The SAT).
25 See Castle Rock Entertainment, 150 F.3d at 136.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See id. NBC requested free copies of The SAT from the defendants and
distributed them together with promotions for the program. See id. "Seinfeld's
executive producer characterized The SAT as 'a fun little book.' "Id.
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evidence that The SAT actually harmed Seinfeld's profitability.29
The plaintiff did, however, demonstrate that it had exercised its
ownership rights in a highly selective manner.30
The first issue the court dealt with was whether The SAT
took sufficient protected expression from Seinfeld as evidenced by
the book's similarity to the television series, such that in the
absence of defenses, the book would infringe the copyright in
Seinfeld.31 The court applied a two-part test, which required the
plaintiff to prove the work was actually copied ("probative
similarity") 2 and that the copying constituted an unlawful or
improper appropriation ("substantial similarity").33 In the case
at bar, actual copying was acknowledged by the defendant.34
Thus, only the second prong of "substantial similarity" remained
to be proven.35 The court analyzed both quantitative and
qualitative aspects of the material copied. 36 Using an aggregate
analysis that treated the copyrighted work as one single unit,
although the 643 fragments were taken from 84 individually
copyrighted episodes, the court found that The SAT passed the
quantitative similarity threshold.3 7 Next, the court found that
The SAT copied creative expression and was qualitatively similar
to the program. 38 The court then dealt with the second issue of
29 See id.
30 See id. Castle Rock rejected several proposals from publishers for a variety of
projects. See id. Castle Rock licensed one Seinfeld book, The Entertainment Weekly
Seinfeld Companion, and has also licensed the production of a CD-ROM product that
will include discussion of the program and may include trivia questions. See id
31 "Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact." See Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). As such, the court of appeals
reviewed the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its finding of fact for clear
error. See Castle Rock Entertainment, 150 F.3d at 136-37.
32 This element is proven by direct evidence of copying or indirect evidence,
including access. See Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997).
33 This is made up of quantitative and qualitative elements as explained in the
text that follows. See Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir.
1992).
34 See Castle Rock Entertainment, 150 F.3d at 137.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 138-39.
37 See id. at 138.
38 See id. at 138-39. The court rejected the applicability of alternative
substantial similarity tests suggested by the defendant, yet went through the
motions of applying them. See id. at 139-41 (discussing other possible tests for
substantial similarity, such as the "ordinary observer" test which focuses on the
aesthetic appeal of the work, the "total concept and feel" test which focuses on the
theme plot and setting of the work, the "fragmented literal similarity test" which
1246 [73:1239
CASTLE ROCK ENTERTAINMENT
whether The SAT constituted fair use of Seinfeld.3 9 The court
weighed the four factors listed in the Copyright Act of 1976.40
Reasoning that the element of commerciality of the work was not
very important, the court did not give it much weight, only noting
that it would favor the plaintiff.41 The court then reasoned that
The SAT did not have a transformative purpose, that the
copyrighted work was fictional, the amount copied was more than
necessary, and that The SAT harmed Seinfeld's market by
cutting into its niche.42  In sum, the court rejected the
defendants' fair use defense relying heavily on its finding that
The SAT was not transformative.
Immediately disposing of the commerciaity component of
the first factor of the fair use test, the court began its analysis
with an assertion that The SATs transformative purpose was
slight to non-existent.43  This conclusion was too extreme. In
view of the fact that the transformative value of a work is a
matter of degree rather than all or nothing the court should have
been more moderate in its evaluation of the work's
transformative purpose. The court went on to distinguish
between works that are "transformative" and outside of an
focuses on quotations and paraphrasing, and the "comprehensive non-literal
similarity" test which focuses on the essence or structure of the work); see also
Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc. 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986) (standing for the proposition
that choreography is copyrightable and may be infringed upon by photographs that
are substantially similar to a ballet). The test for "substantial similarity" is not
whether a work has been reproduced but whether it is substantially similar. See id.
at 162. For Ninth Circuit treatment, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. American
Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D. Cal. 1995). Honda used a "James Bond-
like" scenario in a car commercial aired during the Super Bowl. See id. at 1292. The
commercial showed a young, well-dressed couple in a Honda del Sol being chased by
a helicopter. See id. at 1291. A bad guy jumped out of helicopter onto the car's roof
and threatened the couple. See id. With a flirtatious look at his passenger, the driver
released the detachable roof of the car, getting rid of the bad guy and speeding away.
See id. (Can't youjust hear the theme song in your head?). For substantial similarity
the Ninth Circuit applied a two-part test. See id. at 1297-99. There would be a
finding of infringement only if a plaintiff proved both substantial similarity of
general ideas under the extrinsic test and substantial similarity of the protectable
expression under the intrinsic test. See id. at 1297 (citing Shaw v. Lindheim, 919
F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990)); Sid & Marty Kroffl Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977).
39 See Castle Rock Entertainment, 150 F.3d at 141-46.
40 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see also supra note 10 (listing the four factors).
41 See Castle Rock Entertainment, 150 F.3d at 141-42.
42 See id. at 141-46.
43 See id. at 142.
1999] 1247
ST JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
author's control, and works that "transform" and are within an
author's control because they are considered derivative works.4
Yet, if there was a bright line separating the domain of works the
author controls from the domain of works the author does not
control we would not need to engage in an elaborate and
sometimes confusing fair use analysis. In addition, the court
elevated what it viewed as the non-transformative value of the
work to such a high level that it automatically defeated the three
other prongs of the fair use test.
This Comment asserts that the court was too quick to
pigeonhole The SAT as non-transformative and that it created a
false dichotomy between transformative and derivative uses. In
addition, the court may have unintentionally rigged the fair use
test in the plaintiffs favor by finding that The SAT was not
transformative and allowing that to overshadow the analysis of
the other pertinent factors. This Comment will attempt to walk
the reader through the four fair use factors despite their bubble-
gum like stickiness and to point out the "dja vu" relationship
between the fair use defense and the copyright infringement
claim.
I. FAIR USE
Even prior to the Copyright Act of 1976 courts recognized
that copying or other appropriation of a copyrighted work did not
entail liability if it was reasonable or fair.45 The fair use doctrine
was an equitable one and was considered so amorphous that it
44 See id. at 143. A "derivative work" transforms a copyrighted original work
into a new mode of presentation. A "transformative work" adds something new-a
new meaning or message-to the original. The question of fair use is relevant only to
the inquiry of whether a work is transformative, not whether it is derivative. See id.
at 142-43.
45 See Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Although the First Congress enacted the initial copyright statute in 1790 without
any reference to fair use, the doctrine was recognized by American courts. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994). The foundations for
fair use as we know it today were expressed by Justice Story in the following
manner: "look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale,
or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass 1841) (No. 4,901).
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was indefinable.46 In fact, it was once described as "the most
troublesome in the whole law of copyright."47 Yet, it seems to be
at its core.48 Modern labels and scholarly definitions have not
made the doctrine any more concrete than it was to begin with.49
Because this doctrine is extremely fact sensitive it does not yield
uniform results, leading in turn to a devaluation of its
precedents.50  Excessive flexibility comes at the cost of
predictability.51 This strategy may be effective for Madonna.
Query whether it is as desirable in the legal profession. 52
46 See Time Inc., 293 F. Supp. at 144 ("The doctrine is entirely equitable and is
so flexible as virtually to defy definition.").
47 See id. (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939)).
48 See Leval, supra note 8, at 1110 (stating fair use should not be considered
bizarre since it is an important part of the overall design of the copyright monopoly);
see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (explaining that the fair use
doctrine permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when it
stifles the statute's goals). Thus, fair use is another means of achieving copyright
law goals. The fair use defense is almost always asserted in response to copyright
infringement claims. It logically follows that a defendant will attempt to claim a fair
use privilege because it is so broadly defined. The complexity and malleability of the
doctrine allow the defendant great arguing leeway. This of course will not ensure a
defendant's success since the judge will possess just as much, if not more, leeway in
his or her decision-making process. William F. Patry and Shira Perlmutter assert
that "[bjy definition, once the affirmative defense of fair use is invoked, there has
already been a finding of infiingement. Accordingly, the defendant's use necessarily
falls within the area of the copyright owner's exclusive rights and therefore could
have been licensed. Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 10, at 688. This seems to hone
in on the roles the copyright statute and fair use occupy. The copyright statute
analyzes facts while the fair use doctrine implements policy considerations.
Although the two doctrines have been conceptually separated, it is only through
their interplay that the constitutional goals underlying the Copyright Act can be
achieved.
49 See Leval, supra note 8, at 1106-07 (stating that judges do not share a
common view on the meaning of fair use).
50 See id. at 1106 n.9 (giving examples of reversals and divided courts to
emphasize the fluctuation of the fair use doctrine).
51 Deciding fair use cases can be intimidating for judges due to the doctrine's
open-endedness. See Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 10, at 670 n.18. Judge Leval
stated "It has been exhilirating to find myself present at the cutting edge of the law,
even though in the role of the salami." Id.; see also Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul?
The Nineteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 36 J. CORP. Socy 167, 168
(1989)). There is a temptation to resort to the safety of bright-line rules. See id.
52 See Leval, supra note 8, at 1107 ("Writers, historians, publishers, and their
legal advisers can only guess and pray as to how courts will resolve copyright
disputes.").
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A. The First Factor
The first factor of a fair use determination considers the
purpose and character of the use of a work, including whether
the use is of a commercial nature or for non-profit educational
purposes.53 In Castle Rock Entertainment,54 the court of appeals
immediately rendered the commerciality element moot using the
same unconvincing argument posed by the Supreme Court. 55
The reasoning presented was that because most activities in this
country are commercial the element of commerciality should be
given little to no weight. 56 Although that statement may be true
it does not explain why Congress included the element of
commerciality in its fair use roadmap. A more satisfying
explanation, made by William F. Patry5 7 and Shira Perlmutter,58
based on the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976, is
that Congress inserted the commerciality versus non-profit
distinction simply to appease an interest group.59 Still, the factor
of commerciality should not be completely discounted.60 Instead,
the factor should weigh in favor of a defendant if the use of the
copyrighted material is non-commercial but should not have any
effect if the activity is commercial. 61
53 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see also supra note 10 (listing the first factor).
54 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
55 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (stating that
nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in § 107 are commercial in nature).
56 The court stated that it did not make much of The SATs commercial use, in
line with Campbell. See Castle Rock Entertainment, 150 F.3d 132 at 142.
67 Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration.
58 Assistant Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
69 See Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 10, at 678.
60 It will probably be dealt with anyway in the analysis of the fourth factor-
potential market harm. See e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 37
F.3d 881, 894-95 (2d Cir. 1994) (grappling with unique issues relating to commercial
academic journals, in which the author's main royalties consist of personal prestige
and the possibility of professional advancement, in the context of a potential market
harm-fourth factor analysis), amended, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995).
61 The Copyright Act of 1976 assigns higher value to non-profit purposes. See
Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1374 (2d Cir.
1993). Note the focus is on the use rather than the entity. See Patry & Perhnutter,
supra note 10, at 676. But for a case where the court focuses on the commercial
entity, see American Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d 913, dealing with the photocopying
practices of a researcher working for Texaco. It's actually more exciting then it
sounds!
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Next, the court of appeals attempted to determine whether
the use of Seinfeld by The SAT was transformative. 62 The court
conceded that writing a trivia book about a television program
involved creative expression.63 The defendants decided which
questions to ask, formulated the incorrect answers, interspersed
them amongst the correct ones and placed the questions in order
of difficulty.64 Nevertheless, the court found that The SAT was
not sufficiently transformative to justify a finding of fair use.65
The court relied on Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications
International, Ltd.,66 stating that The SAT was far less
transformative than other works it had held not to constitute fair
use.67 In doing so, the court ignored its finding in Twin Peaks
Productions that the allegedly infringing book, about the
television show, served a fair use purpose and was a comment
which could be considered transformative. 68
While the court in Twin Peaks Productions ultimately found
the first factor to weigh against the defendant, this was not due
to the book's overall non-transformative purpose.69 Instead, the
Twin Peaks Productions court reasoned that the defendant's book
included a detailed report of the first eight episodes of the show,
going far beyond a broad outline necessary for the transformative
62 A transformative use is one that is productive and uses the copied material in
a different manner than the original. See Leval, supra note 8, at 1111. The
secondary work must do more then supersede the original. See id. If the original is
used as raw material and additions are made to it, such as new information, insights
or aesthetics, the use will be considered transformative. See id. Transformative
purpose does not ensure a successful case. See id. Although a transformative use is
not necessary for finding fair use, for example, see Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984), the goal of copyright is
usually served by transformative uses. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 579 (1994). The more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of the other factors. See id. Parody has an obvious claim to
transformative value. See id
63 See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132,
143 (2d Cir. 1998) ("To be sure, the act of testing trivia about a creative work, in
question and answer form, involves some creative expression.").
64 See id. at 143.
65 See id.
66 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).
67 See Castle Rock Entertainment, 150 F.3d at 143 (citing Twin Peaks Prods.,
996 F.2d at 1378).
6S See Twin Peaks Prods., 996 F.2d at 1374 (stating that the book is surely a
comment and perhaps even qualifies as criticism and news reporting).
69 See id. at 1373-74 (explaining that, in determining fair use, purpose "is not
an all or nothing matter").
19991 1251
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
purposes of comment or criticism. 70 The court considered the plot
reports an abridgement of the television series and found that
that they constituted a derivative use.71 The implication was
that had the plot reports not been as detailed, the book, which
also included trivia questions and other information about the
show's characters, would have been transformative. 72
The district court in Castle Rock Entertainment followed the
rationale of the Twin Peaks Productions decision and found that
The SAT, which did not include any detailed plot summaries but
only trivia questions and answers, was in fact transformative.73
It concluded that The SAT was not a fair use despite its
transformative purpose, due to other factors.74 This author
believes that the court of appeals was too quick to decide that
The SAT did not have a transformative purpose.7 5 The district
court was more thorough in its analysis than the court of
appeals.
There is an argument that fan activity such as the
dissemination of a trivia book is transformative.76 Fan writing
has been characterized by the scholar Michel de Certeau as
"poaching" or raiding on literary preserves and taking that which
70 Id. at 1375
71 See id. at 1375-76.
72 See id. (explaining that defendant summarized the plaintiffs television series
in great detail, as opposed to merely giving a brief indication of the plot and as such
was not fair use).
73 The district court found that The SAT qualified as "criticism, comment,
scholarship, or research" under § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. Castle Rock
Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 268 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), affd, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998). The court further found that The SAT was
transformative due to its creativity. See id. The court reasoned that by testing
Seinfeld fans on their knowledge of the program the defendants "added something
new" to Seinfeld. Id.
74 See id. at 272. The court drew its conclusion based on the following. 1)
Seinfeld was a work of fiction, and as such, afforded a special status in copyright
law; 2) The SAT drew upon essential elements of Seinfeld and little else; and 3) The
SAT occupied a market which the plaintiff should have been able to control. See id.
75 See Noel D. Humphreys, When in Doubt Don't Copy, 20 PA. LAW. 42,42 (1998)
(questioning on what principled basis a court can find a trivia book is different from
a newspaper review of a Seinfeld episode).
76 The district court found that the defendants identified a creative and original
way to capitalize on the development of television culture in our society. See Castle
Rock Entertainment, 955 F. Supp. at 268. People increasingly treat fictional
television characters and their lives as though they have factual significance. See id
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is pleasurable.77 In de Certeau's view, consumption of text is
"making it one's own, appropriating or reappropriating it." 78 The
"ability to transform personal reaction into social interaction...
is one of the central characteristics of fandom."79 The proposition
that The SAT served a purpose that was distinguishable from
that of the program Seinfeld is not as outlandish as the court and
the plaintiff made it out to be.80 The book would have allowed for
interactive play and would not have "merely supersede[d]" 8' the
program. In fact, it is difficult to imagine that one would. have
any interest in the book without having already obsessively
watched the program8 2 and the book would be serving a different
social purpose.
77 See Henry Jenkins III, Star Trek Rerun, Reread, Rewritten: Fan Writing as
Textual Poaching, in CRITICAL STUDIES IN MASS COMMUNICATION, June 1988, at 86;
see also Jon Pareles, Parody, Not Smut, Has Rappers in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
1993, at A13 (regarding 2 Live Crew's fair use claim in the Supreme Court). In
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569 (1993), 2 Live Crew claimed that its
appropriation of Roy Orbison's song Pretty Woman was fair because it constituted a
parody. In the article the journalist remarks:
Any song that is well enough known to make a takeoff worthwhile has
probably raked in plenty of profits from sales, licensing agreements, sheet
music, etc. Sometimes I'm tempted to suggest that any song that has sold
more than a million (or maybe two million or five million) copies ought to go
directly into the public domain, as if its fans have ransomed it from the
copyright holders.
Pareles, supra at A13.
Thus, there is a layman's view of fair use, an intuitive limit on what fans believe
should belong to those they support. Yet, to promote the goals of copyright it may
have to be ensured that talented individuals are not cut off from their rewards on an
arbitrary economic basis. It must be remembered that talent is not enough but that
an artist or inventor must be willing to take a risk and risk is closely tied with
potential reward (as well as self-realization of course).
78 See Jenkins supra note 77, at 86.
79 Id. at 88.
80 Defendants claimed that The SAT was transformative because as a text
testing one's knowledge it qualified as "criticism, comment, scholarship, or research"
and because it was a work that decoded and critically restructured Seinfeld. Castle
Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir.
1998). The plaintiff dismissed these arguments as post-hoc rationalizations, claiming
that had the book been as creative as this lawyering the defendant's may have had a
chance. See id. The court rejected the defendant's claim finding that the trivia book
was not a comment or criticism because it did nothing more than pose questions and
it did not hold itself out to be critical. See id. at 142-43.
81 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Leval, supra note 8, at 1111).
82 See Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp. at
271 (stating that the book compliments the show and would only be of value to
someone who watched it).
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B. Transformative Versus Transform
The term "transformative," as coined by courts and legal
scholars, is used to describe the function of uses such as
commentary, criticism, news reporting, and research.83 These
works appropriate material in order to bring out a message
different from the one the original work embodies.84 Yet, it does
not seem correct to assert that a work that falls under the term
"derivative,"8 5 as defined in the Copyright Act, is necessarily not
also transformative. This author does not doubt that there are
several stories whose movie versions have served a completely
different purpose than the original story. Sometimes simply
changing an ending can have the effect of altering the work in its
entirety. That does not mean that movie versions are not
derivative works although they are at times transformative.
A trivia book is not specifically covered by the list of works
that have been labeled derivative86 nor does it match a specific
definition of fair use.8 7 Because both derivative works and fair
use are so broadly defined, a trivia book could fit under either
rubric.88 Forming a dichotomy between two categories which
overlap in content but only differ in the final label we give them
is not very helpful.8 9 This was the dichotomy established by the
83 See Leval, supra note 8, at 1111. Leval notes that:
if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings-this is
the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the
enrichment of society.
Transformative uses may include criticizing the quoted work, exposing the
character of the original author, proving a fact, or summarizing an idea
argued in the original in order to defend or rebut it. They also may include
parody, symbolism, aesthetic declarations and innumerable other uses.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
84 Thus, a film critic may ruin a movie for the rest of us by telling us the whole
plot and quoting all the good lines. She can shield herself from litigation with a
bullet proof fair use defense. She is appropriating copyrighted material, but she is
commenting, criticizing and reporting.
85 See supra note 3.
86 See id.
87 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see also supra note 10 (quoting § 107).
88 See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v Carol Pubrg Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp.
260, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting absence of case law on the copyright status of a
trivia book), affd, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
89 In an attempt to clarify terminology, the Second Circuit created a false
dichotomy between factor one, which evaluates transformative value, and factor
four, which takes into consideration harm to the original and its derivatives. This
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Second Circuit in Castle Rock Entertainment,90 and it will be
difficult to follow.
C. The Second Factor
The second factor of the fair use test considers the nature of
the work infringed upon.91 Much like the commerciality element
present in the first factor, this seems to be too general to tip the
scale in favor of either side. Most of the time copyrighted works
are fictional in nature and if not fictional they have some
originality of expression or compilation.92 Originality is the sine
qua non of copyright.93 Thus, without the prerequisite of
creativity we would not reach the claim of infringement or the
fair use defense. The issue of fact or fiction of the elements
copied is dealt with in the plaintiffs case in chief under the test
for "substantial similarity."9 4
At first blush, the second factor seems to mirror the
"substantial similarity"95 test of the copyright infringement claim
without adding anything new. So what's the twist? Well,
theoretically speaking, we now look at the nature of the
copyrighted work as a whole, rather than solely at the element
copied.96 It is questionable whether the nature of the work will
may make the fair use test less efficient. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v.
Carol Pubrg Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
90 See id.
91 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see also supra note 10 (listing the second factor).
92 See supra note 6.
93 See id.
9 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)
(stating a two part burden of proof for copyright infringement); see also 4 NIMMER &
NIhIMER, supra note 7, at 13-11 to -12 (describing both actual copying and
substantial similarity). Substantial similarity measures whether the copying is
significant as a matter of law. See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g
Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260,265 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
95 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
96 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (explaining
that the second factor recognizes that some works receive more protection and citing
cases that contrast fact and fiction; implying that fiction receives greater protection).
Practically speaking, when would the second factor carry any weight? Well, perhaps
if the work were generally factual but contained some fiction which an alleged
infringer copied, the work as a whole would be less worthy of protection. Still, it
seems more logical that a court would look at the specific elements copied. If the
situation was reversed-that is if there was a fictional work from which factual
information was copied, as mentioned in the text, we would not reach this point in
the analysis. The exception would be if the alleged infringer copied a factual
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have any effect on the fair use defense. A court is more likely to
focus on the elements allegedly infringed upon which, as
explained above, have already been determined to rise to the
level of an original expression. 97 Alternatively, a court may not
give this factor in and of itself much weight but allow it to
become overshadowed by the first factor. 98  That was the
approach taken by the court of appeals in Castle Rock
Entertainment.99
D. The Third Factor
The third factor of the fair use test deals with the amount
and substantiality of the portion used.1 ° The third factor seems
to be intertwined with copyright infringement.101 If "substantial
arrangement rather than the facts themselves. See supra note 6. Another focus of
the first factor may be the publication status of a book. The "nature" of the work has
also been understood to mean whether it has been published or not. See Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (noting that the
inquiry is narrower with respect to unpublished works); New Era Publications Int'l
v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989). There is a view that the first
factor should not revolve around the published/unpublished dichotomy. See Leval,
supra note 8, at 1118-19.
9 For example, in Monster Communications, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.,
935 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) the court viewed the second factor in light of the
fact that the work infringed upon was a creative film deserving of heightened
protection. Rather than concluding the second factor favored the plaintiff, the court
went on to look at the specific elements copied and their factual nature. See id. at
494-95. The court also considered the level of transformativeness of the infringing
work and decided it outweighed the harm caused by the infringement. See id. at 495.
In sum, the second factor was wiped out with great ease.
98 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (downplaying the significance of the second
factor as a useful tool when the infringement is a parody).
99 See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp.
260, 142-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (deciding that the second factor favored the plaintiff
due to the lack of transformative value of the work), affd, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
1998). Thus, the determination of a work's transformative value colored the analysis
of the second factor. Id.
100 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see also supra note 10 (listing the third factor).
101 See Castle Rock Entertainment, 150 F.3d at 144 (correcting the district
court's error in determining that a finding of "substantial similarity" in a copyright
infringement was sufficient evidence of the third factor of the fair use defense). The
rationale of the district court would have suggested that the third factor would
always weigh against the defendant because "substantial similarity" would
necessarily have been proven by this point in the case. See id.
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similarity" has been already established, why discuss it again?10 2
The variation is that it is now examined within the context of the
purpose of the infringing work.10 3 Thus, if the court of appeals
had found that The SAT was somewhat transformative, it may
have also considered that the amount copied by the book was not
excessive. A trivia book about a television show must
appropriate moments from the show in order to remind the
readers of the show's content and help them reach the correct
answers. Because the court did not find that the book had
transformative value it was prejudiced against the defendant in
weighing the third factor. This is understandable in light of the
Supreme Court's guidance that a non-transformative purpose
would be less deserving of a defense to copy large amounts from a
copyrighted work.10 4
Yet, the author believes that a rule based on a work's
transformative value is too general and does not account for the
fact that the amount taken will be highly dependent not only on
the purpose of the work but on the medium of the copyrighted
work, as well as the medium of the allegedly infringing work.105
In addition, it is very difficult to ascertain whether works should
be considered more or less transformative based on their content.
Courts seem to have adopted the view that direct reproductions
used distributively are least transformative while parodies are
most transformative. 106 It may not serve the goals of copyright 0 7
102 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that "[tlo a
large degree, [the third] factor involve[d] the same analysis as that used when
determining if the copy is substantially similar to the original").
103 We have established that a substantial amount has been copied but are now
considering the amount copied in relation to the type used. See Campbell, 510 U.S.
at 586.
104 The Supreme Court has stated that the more transformative a use, the more
that can be taken by the user. See id.
105 For example, a research project may require a greater appropriation of
material than a skit on Saturday Night Live. This is due to the different media and
does not necessarily correlate with the level of transformativeness.
106 Even at the extremes we find ourselves in murky waters. It is not always
clear what parody is and whether it must use the copyrighted work as a vehicle or as
a target. The Second Circuit has ruled that a parody does not have to comment on
the original but can comment on society at large. See Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
Broad. Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that copyright law needs to
be accepting of the humor of parody in today's society of "unrelieved solemnity"). The
Second Circuit has also held that a parody cannot be on life in general. The
copyrighted work must be in part the object of parody. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677
F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) ("We agree with appellants' argument to the extent of
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holding that a permissible parody need not be directed solely to the copyrighted song
but may also reflect on life in general."). In deciding how much a parody can take,
the Second Circuit has used the "conjure up" test, in which a parody is allowed to at
least "conjure up" the original. See Elsmere Music, Inc., 623 F.2d at 253 n.1; see also
Yankee Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(citing Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310 for the proposition "that there cannot be a parody if
the object of the parody is unknown to the audience"); E. Scott Fruehwald, The
Parody Fair Use Defense After Campbell, 18 COLUMK-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103, 131
(1994) (discussing different commentators' theories on parody and fair use, including
absolute protection of a parody as suggested by Michael C. Albin; more limited
protection or "critical effect" as suggested by Susan Faaland; an economic/market
failure approach suggested by Brian R. Landy; parody as First Amendment speech
suggested by Charles Goetsch; a functional test suggested by Nimmer;
apportionment of profits as a solution to parody as suggested by Melanie C.
Clemmons). ,
Courts do not always find that a parody can overcome other fair use factors
when it is used as an advertisement (commerciality at its extreme). See Tin Pan
Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 828-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(rejecting a parody defense to a rap group's style). But see Leibovitz v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding use of photos constitutes
parody deserving of the fair use defense); Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co.,
765 F. Supp. 440, 448 (N.D. IlM. 1991) (holding for defendant because there was no
harm to plaintiffs market). Courts generally do not appreciate parodies when they
are of children's favorite characters. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (dealing with
Cabbage Patch Kids); DC Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1177
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (dealing with Superman). But see Warner Bros. Inc. v. American
Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983). In Warner Bros., the court dealt with a
parody of Superman on the television show Greatest American Hero. See id. at 235.
The court did not find substantial similarity and did not reach the issue of fair use.
See id. at 243. The court explained that it is inevitable that in an era of mass
communication, popular phrases and fragments of expression will become part of
language. See id. at 242. Regardless of how well-known a copyrighted phrase
becomes, its author can guard against its appropriation for the sale of commercial
products. See id. For example, the court discussed the Crazy Eddie parody of
Superman which was not permitted. See id. ("Look! ... Up in the sky!... Irs a
bird! ... It's a plane... It's Crazy Eddie!"). Curiously, the court did not consider
that the television show at issue (Greatest American Hero) was just as commercial as
Crazy Eddie, although perhaps not as insane. For another case of usage of a
children's character where the court found infringement, see Dr. Seuss Enters. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. dismissed, 521 U.S.
1146 (1997). The court found that The Cat Not in the Hat!, a parody of the O.J.
Simpson trial written in the style of the author was not fair use. See id. at 1396.
When analyzing the first factor the court determined that the use was not
transformative, because it brought no new expression, meaning, or message. See id
at 1401. The court seemed to have decided ahead of time that it was not going to
allow the writer to get away with appropriating a children's character for
controversial commentary. Otherwise, how could the court have found that the book
was wholly non-transformative when it took only the style of the writer and came up
with creative ideas? The following is a sample passage:
A happy town
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to base the third factor analysis mainly on how transformative
the work is, without considering the uniqueness of each
medium. 08
Inside LA.
Where rich folks play
The day away.
But under the moon
The 12th of June.
Two victims flail
Assault! Assail!
Somebody will go to jail!
Who will it be?
Oh my! Oh me!
Another passage was as follows:
A plea went out to Rob Shapiro
Can you save the fallen hero?
And Marcia Clark, hooray, hooray
Was called in with a justice play.
A man this famous
Never hires
Lawyers like
Jacoby-Meyers.
When you're accused of a killing scheme
You need to build a real Dream Team.
Cochran! Cochran!
Doodle-doo
Johnnie, won't you join the crew?
Cochran! Cochran!
Deedle-dee
The Dream Team needs a victory.
Id.
For another case where the court found infringement by a work that could
arguably be classified as a parody, see Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d
751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating excessive copying on its own may preclude fair use
even without an analysis of the remaining relevant factors).
107 See supra note 1.
108 Because the fair use is so fact sensitive it is difficult to predict what courts
will find transformative. In addition to all the fair use factors, the fact patterns that
come up are also unpredictable. The comparison of media is non-linear and therefore
sometimes it is difficult to ascertain what is substantially similar and, later in the
case, what is transformative. It may be helpful to simply survey cases that deal with
different media. For a case that deals with the transformation of a photo to a
sculpture, see Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304-05. In Rogers, a photographer claimed his
copyright in an original photo was infringed upon by a three-dimensional sculpture.
See id. at 305. The court rejected the fair use defense. See id. at 306. The scupturer
claimed to be making a statement about modern culture by using a popular photo
that was part of collective subconciousness. See id. at 309. The court did not think
the work rose to the level of parody. See id. at 310. It did not believe the work to be
transformative. The court claimed that the essence of the plaintiffs work had been
taken and that was more than necessary for a parody. See id. at 311. It seems that
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E. The Fourth Factor
The fourth factor considers the effect of the use of the
infringing work upon the potential market for, or value of, the
copyrighted work.109 Under this factor, the extent of market
for the purposes of pop-art one should be able to use an entire object. Sometimes
simply placing an object in an unfamiliar setting is art. The court did not analyze
the medium of sculpture nor the kind of taking that the artist's style required. It
only spoke of parody in a generic sense and decided that too much protected material
had been appropriated. See id.; see also United Feature Syndicate v. Koons, 817 F.
Supp. 370, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that the sculpture of the cartoon character
Odie by the same artist was not fair use). Art will not immunize an infringer,
especially if the art is for sale. See id. at 379.
Courts have been more liberal with respect to infringg songs although there
has been fluctuation and disagreement as to how much can be taken. See Benny v.
Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1956) (stating that parody should not receive
special treatment and that one cannot copy the substance of another's work without
infringing his copyright); see also MCA Inc., 677 F.2d at 185 (holding Cunnilingus
Champion of Company C was not fair use of Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B
since it was not a parody of the song).
We are not prepared to hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a
competitor's copyrighted song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform it
for commercial gain, and then escape liability by calling the end result a
parody or satire on the mores of society. Such a holding would be an open-
ended invitation to musical plagiarism.
Id. But see id. at 188 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (advocating a broader view of parody
and stating that whether parody is obscene is irrelevant to fair use decision; stating
that a successful artist must tolerate a higher degree of criticism from others, much
like a public figure).
For a case discussing a biography, see New Era Publications Intl v. Carol Publ'g
Group, 904 F.2d 152, 161 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding defendant's use of quotations from
L. Ron Hubbard's published works on The Church Of Scientology was protected
when used in a critical biography of Hubbard). But see Salinger v. Random House,
Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that a biographer was not protected by
fair use, because the taking of author J.D. Salinger's unpublished letter was too
extensive). See Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 740 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that the use of Richard Wright's unpublished letter in a biography was fair,
important to the public, not exploitative of literary value, and not extensive); see also
Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 847 F. Supp. 142 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (dealing with the claim
by an author of an unpublished letter that his rights were infringed upon by
publication of a biography). As noted, decisions flip like a fish out of water because
the defense is so fact sensitive.
Measuring fair use is difficult within the context of mass communications, pop-
culture, and constant dialogue between advertisers and viewers with common
language taken from television land. Courts have found that fictional characters are
protected. See Warner Bros. Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.
1983) (Superman is protected); New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group,
693 F. Supp. 1517, 1521 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Freddy is protected); Anderson v.
Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1166-67 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (Rocky is protected).
109 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see also supra note 10 (listing the fourth factor).
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harm and whether conduct of the kind engaged in by the alleged
infringer would harm the potential market for the original or its
derivative markets is considered.110 Thus, the original and its
potential derivative markets are compared to a possible
transformative use, taking us back to the first factor."1 It is
asked once again if the allegedly infringing work is within the
realm of the author's control or if its qualities are so
transformative that they could not reasonably be held to be
within the author's domain.112 Once it is found that a use is
highly transformative, it will probably be found that it is not
derivative. At the other end of the scale, a copyright holder
cannot preempt the market for works that are transformative. 113
The analysis is circular. It asks where the limit should be set
while setting it.
It is integral to the analysis that the fourth factor is not
concerned with whether the secondary use suppresses or destroys
the market for the original or its derivative, but whether it
usurps or substitutes for the original and its derivative
market.114 This does not simplify the analysis because in order to
determine when an opportunity has been usurped from the
copyright holder it is asked once again whether the use was
transformative, thus barring the holder from expecting a return
for the usage. What should be considered derivative other than
what is listed in the Copyright Act 15 and what should be
considered transformative other than § 107?116 This is a world
where copyright holders increasingly tend to be huge
110 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S 569, 590-92 (1994).
111 See id. at 591 (stating that market harm is less likely if a work is
transformative, especially if it is a parody). The transformative purpose was
ascertained by the first factor.
112 See id. (citing Bisceglia, ASCAP, Copyright Law Symposium, No. 34, at 23
for the proposition that the parody and the original serve different markets).
113 A secondary user cannot exploit markets that the original copyright holder
would develop or license even if he or she had not actually done so. See Castle Rock
Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Pubrg Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 n.11 (2d Cir.
1998). Similarly, copyright owners cannot preempt exploitation of transformative
markets. See id. A copyright owner cannot enter fair use markets in order to prevent
others from entering those markets. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 7,
§13.05[A][4], at 13-181 to -182; see also American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.,
60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994).
114 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593.
115 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994); see also supra note 3 (quoting § 106 in part).
116 See supra note 10.
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conglomerates who control far-reaching markets117 and favor a
total merchandise strategy.118 At the same time, there are now
more technologies facilitating the public's ability to gain access to
and transform other people's work. 119 This tension makes the
fourth factor along with its first factor alter ego very difficult to
resolve.
In Castle Rock Entertainment, the court of appeals once
again allowed the finding that The SAT was not transformative
to color its analysis. The court conceded that Castle Rock had
little, if any, interest in exploiting the trivia book market. 120 Yet,
it categorized the book as a derivative work.121 It is
understandable that a copyright holder has the right to refrain
from exploiting a market. It is doubtful, however, that an
unrealized market is indeed a derivative one if there is no
evidence that shows the owner's interest in it, nor reference to it
in the Copyright Act as derivative. On the other hand, proving
that the use was not within the owner's domain would have been
just as difficult for the defendants who were required to bear
117 See generally DONALD E. BIEDERMAN, ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES 3-5 (3d ed. 1996) (describing trends of consolidation).
118 See generally HORACE NEWCOMB, TELEVISION: THE CRITICAL VIEW (5th ed.)
(reprinting Christopher Anderson, Disneyland, in HOLLYWOOD TV (University of
Texas Press 1993)). Walt Disney was a pioneer in total merchandising or creating an
all-encompassing consumer environment. He united a television program and
amusement park under the same name. See id. at 71. His products included movies,
amusement park rides, toys, television programs, and more. See id.
119 For example, video games are uploaded and downloaded from computer
controlled electronic billboards. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923
(N.D. Cal. 1996). The Internet has not been afforded special status with respect to
fair use. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569, 1574 (1996).
A copyright infringement claim on the Internet must be judged with reference to §
107. See id. (explaining that the factors in § 107 must always be considered in
determining what is fair use). See generally Jonathan Dowell, Bytes and Pieces:
Fragmented Copies, Licensing, and Fair Use in a Digital World, 86 CAL. L. REV. 843
(1998) (analyzing fair use from an economic perspective and the function it serves to
prevent market failure and predicting the results of the doctrine's confrontation with
developed licensing schemes); DanThu Thi Phan, Note, Will Fair Use Function on
the Internet?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 169 (1998) (discussing current proposals generated
by the Conference on Fair Use and suggesting they will cause an imbalance in
copyright law).
12 See Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 144-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
121 See id. at 143.
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both the burden of production and persuasion.122 In general, the
fourth factor poses a problem of proof for both parties. In this
case, neither party was convincing as to whether the trivia book
at issue constituted a derivative work, yet the court found in
favor of the plaintiff. In determining whether an opportunity
had been usurped by The SAT, the court of appeals was forced to
rely on Seinfeld's not so secret ingredient-nothing.
CONCLUSION
The SAT may not have been highbrow research or
particularly enlightening, but it did deserve some
"transformative" credit. That is not to say it would have
overcome all of the fair use factors. Yet, by sharply ruling out
any transformative value as a matter of law and using that as a
sword that would cut off all the other factors of the fair use
defense, the court of appeals went too far. The fair use test
allows courts to consider any, all, or none of the factors and to
rely on additional factors as well. Theoretically, courts follow the
yellow brick road and apply the four factors. On many occasions,
however, it seems as though courts are only going through the
motions of applying the test and their holdings are more a matter
of taste than a matter of law. The attempt to view fair use as a
122 Fair use is an affirmative defense in which the defendant bears the burden of
production and persuasion. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
590 (1994). While affirmative defenses may be raised in a motion to dismiss,
defenses such as fair use which require lengthy analysis are better resolved at a
later stage of discovery by a summary judgment motion or adjudications at trial. See
nt-Elect Eng'g v. Clinton Harley Corp., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1631, 1633 (1993).
Before the assertion that fair use was an affirmative defense was made by the
Supreme Court, and even after it was made, there were procedural
misunderstandings by the lower courts. The Supreme Court's decision of the case
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984), caused much
confusion with respect to presumptions. That case proposed that every commercial
use carried with it a presumption that the use was unfair. After that decision came
down, several courts were applying these presumptions in the technical sense
(shifting the burden of proof). Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 562 (1985), changed language of "presumption" to "tendency." In Sony
Corp., there was also a presumption that if the use was commercial, harm was
presumed. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451. In Campbell, the Court cleared the
matter up by stating there was no inference or presumption of market harm in any
case that involved more than pure duplication. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591. See
generally Patry & Perlnutter, supra note 10, at 688. It seems from Campbell that
we can place transformative value on a continuum that ranges between duplication
and parody, with duplication being the least transformative and parody the most.
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set of four distinct factors, operating independently, is nearly
impossible. Courts should not, however, avoid this difficulty by
combining the factors into one. Allowing the factors to interact,
overlap, clash, and yes, even to confuse us, will promote progress,
which is the central goal of copyright law.
Shiri Rosental
